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COUNTERFEIT PHARMACEUTICALS IN CHINA: 
COULD CHANGES BRING STRONGER PROTECTION 
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND  
HUMAN HEALTH? 
Dina M. Bronshtein† 
Abstract:  Although China seeks to improve its image as a legitimate participant in 
the global intellectual property (“IP”) market, Chinese companies continue to produce 
more than thirty percent of the counterfeit drugs circulating in the world today.  The 
counterfeit pharmaceutical industry profits from efficient and cost-effective production 
systems by producing counterfeits at an exceedingly low cost.  This poses a serious 
problem because the production and sale of counterfeit drugs leads to negative economic 
and social health-related effects.  China’s existing penalties for counterfeit 
pharmaceutical production are considered a mere cost of doing business in China, rather 
than a deterrent from engaging in counterfeiting.  China’s national government has taken 
several steps to fight against IP infringement, but despite this effort, the growing power 
and autonomy of local governments has complicated and exacerbated the problem. 
In order to become a legitimate and reputable force in the international economy, 
China must take greater steps to limit the production and sale of counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals.  First, China must amend its laws to include penalties that will 
effectively deter actors from entering the counterfeit market.  Second, China must 
allocate a significant amount of resources to the judicial system to ensure that 
adjudication is effective and efficient.  Third, China must fight localized corruption at its 
source to increase enforcement of IP rights.  Specifically, an agency should be created to 
target local corruption and to disestablish the counterfeit pharmaceutical market.  This 
agency should have investigative and auditing power and should work to educate both the 
public and the business community on the problems posed by counterfeit pharmaceuticals 
and the means used to counter them. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The World Health Organization (“WHO”) defines a counterfeit drug 
as “a medicine, which is deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with 
respect to identity and/or source.”1  China is one of the world’s top 
producers of both legitimate and counterfeit pharmaceuticals.2  In 1980, 
China took initial significant steps to improve its IP climate when it joined 
                                           
†
  Juris Doctor expected 2009, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like to 
thank the editors of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal.   
1
  INT’L FED’N OF PHARM. MFRS. & ASSOC., COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES: AN UPDATE ON ESTIMATES 1 
(2006), http://www.ifpma.org/Issues/fileadmin/templates/ifpmaissues/pdfs/IMPACT_counterfeit_estimate 
_15Nov06.pdf. 
2
  See Maria Nelson et al., Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals: A Worldwide Problem, 96 TRADEMARK 
REP. 1068, 1089 (2006). 
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the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”).3  Since this 
important development, China has adopted and amended its IP law, signed 
several treaties, and joined international organizations to work towards 
establishing a “made by China” label, rather than remaining with the “made 
in China” label.4  These changes have led to fast-paced growth of intellectual 
property activity.5  In fact, according to a WIPO report, China has become 
the third largest recipient of patent filings with a filing increase of almost 
thirty-three percent in 2004 alone.6  Although these numbers seem 
promising, China’s prominent role in the counterfeit drug market reveals its 
ongoing inability to enforce IP rights or to prosecute infringement through 
administrative, civil, or criminal mechanisms.7 
Worldwide, the counterfeit drug market accounts for approximately 
forty billion dollars in annual sales.8  China is a lead actor in this market, and 
its role will arguably only increase in the future.9  Although there are 
significant profits that can be earned from participation in the counterfeit 
drug market, counterfeiting also results in physical harm or death to 
thousands of people globally,10 as well as decreased confidence in the 
Chinese economy and stifled innovation.11  The Chinese government could 
arguably approach this problem head-on by amending legislation and 
increasing enforcement efforts.  Additionally, it could work to eliminate the 
local government corruption that undermines existing counterfeit drug 
regulations.12 
This comment discusses the issues revolving around China’s 
counterfeit drug industry and provides suggestions as to how the Chinese 
                                           
3
  Permanent Mission of P.R.C. to the U.N. Office at Geneva and Other Int’l Orgs. in Switz., The 
Cooperation Between China and the World Intellectual Property Organization (Apr. 19, 2004), 
http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgjblc/t85562.htm. 
4
  See Jayanthi Iyengar, Intellectual Property Piracy Rocks China Boat, ASIA TIMES, Sept. 16, 2004, 
available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FI16Ad07.html; see also Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 
1089. 
5
  See generally HUAIWEN HE & PING ZHANG, IMPACT OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM ON 
ECONOMIC GROWTH, COUNTRY REPORT-CHINA, http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/wipo_unu_ 
07_china.pdf (last visited Feb.8, 2008) (discussing development of Chinese IP System). 
6
  World Intellectual Property Organization [hereinafter WIPO], WIPO Patent Report:  Statistics on 
Worldwide Patent Activities, at 10 (2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ 
freepublications/en/patents/931/wipo_pub_931.pdf. 
7
  U.S. Dep’t. of Comm. Int. Trade Admin., IPR Toolkit: Protecting Your Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) in China (Dec. 2005), http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/protecting_ipr.html. 
8
  Ying Huang, AstraZeneca Adopts Digital Security to Deter Chinese Counterfeiting, PHARMAASIA 
NEWS, Sept. 5, 2007, http://fdcalerts.typepad.com/asia/2007/09/astrazeneca-ado.html. 
9
  See Peggy B. Hu & Berta Gomez, Public Safety Jeopardized by Chinese Counterfeiters, Experts 
Say (May 20, 2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/May/20-45620.html. 
10
  Id. 
11
  See Iyengar, supra note 4.  
12
  See Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 1089. 
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government can better address this problem.  Part II discusses the serious 
health threats posed by counterfeit drugs, introduces a prominent example of 
drug counterfeiting, and presents the steps China has already taken to fight 
against IP infringement.  Part III describes the body of Chinese law created 
to confront IP infringement and fight against counterfeiting.  Part IV 
addresses the legal mechanisms used to enforce these IP laws and discusses 
specific issues that hinder deterrence of pharmaceutical counterfeiting.  
Finally, Part V suggests possible means by which the Chinese government 
could improve enforcement of IP laws in order to reduce China’s production 
and sale of counterfeit drugs. 
II. BACKGROUND ON PHARMACEUTICAL COUNTERFEITING  
Countries around the world have communicated their strong 
opposition to drug counterfeiting, despite the fact that counterfeiting has the 
ability to yield high economic gains for those who do business in the 
industry.13  The rise of counterfeit drugs has caused a decrease in innovation 
and investment in legitimate pharmaceutical companies.  It has also caused a 
wide array of social and economic problems for China.14 
A. Pharmaceutical Counterfeiting Causes Serious Physical and 
Economic Harm 
According to WHO, counterfeit drugs account for ten percent of the 
world’s pharmaceuticals, though this number may be as high as sixty percent 
in some developing countries.15  Counterfeit drugs will be worth 
approximately seventy-five billion dollars globally by 2010.16  Due to 
China’s significant contribution to this mass production, the United States 
has placed China on its “priority watch list”17 of countries failing to protect 
IP rights adequately and reduce infringement levels significantly.18 
                                           
13
  See Jim Hilboldt, Counterfeit Medicines Outside the United States: Challenges and Responses, in 
PHARMACEUTICAL LAW 2006: ACROSS THE PRODUCTION LIFE CYCLE 869, 874 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks, & Literary Property, Course Handbook Series, 2006).  
14
  See Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 1072. 
15
  See U.S. Chamber of Commerce View on China’s Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights and 
The Dangers of the Movement of Counterfeited and Pirated Goods into the U.N., Testimony Before the 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (June 7, 2006) [hereinafter U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce] (statement of Myron Brilliant, Vice-President, East Asia U.S. Chamber of Commerce,), 
available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/written_testimonies/06_06_07wrts/06_06_7_8_ 
brilliant_myron.php. 
16
  WHO, Counterfeit Medicines (Nov. 14, 2006), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/ 
fs275/en/. 
17
  The United States places countries that have failed to meet its IP protection standards on a 
“priority watch list.”  See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SPECIAL 301 REPORT: EXECUTIVE 
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The counterfeit pharmaceuticals market presents a serious health risk 
to both Chinese citizens and to the international community.  This growing 
problem is due to the fact that approximately fifty percent of China’s drug 
supply is counterfeit.19  According to Shenzhen Evening News, a Chinese 
government-run news station, approximately 192,000 people died in China 
in 2001 due to consumption of counterfeit drugs.20  In considering this 
figure, it is important to remember that although this may not seem 
significant in comparison to China’s population of over one billion, the 
actual death toll is likely to be much higher than the reported number.21 
Counterfeit drugs cause fatalities through both immediate and latent 
effects.22  For example, some counterfeits can accelerate the growth of drug-
resistant virus strains.23  This occurs when the counterfeit contains too little 
of the necessary active ingredients making up the legitimate drug and, 
therefore, does not kill all the disease agents, causing the strains to spread.24  
This problem is especially evident in developing countries that lack the 
resources and political will to fight against counterfeiting; residents of such 
countries are often those that need the most legitimate medical attention.25 
The detrimental economic effects of pharmaceutical counterfeiting 
reach beyond the borders of the source country.26  Producers of counterfeit 
                                                                                                                              
SUMMARY 18-19 (2007), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_ 
Special_301_Review/asset_upload_file473_9336.pdf [hereinafter SPECIAL 301 REPORT].  The Special 301 
Report is released annually by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.  It reports on the adequacy and 
effectiveness of intellectual property (“IP”) rights protection of U.S. trading partners.  See BeSpacific, 
USTR’s 2007 Special 301 Report (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.bespacific.com/mt/archives/014712.html. 
18
  See U.S. Dept. of State, China Has High Rate of Intellectual Property Infringement (Apr. 29, 
2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/usinfo/Archive/2005/Apr/29-580129.html. 
19
  Amy Reeves, Clamping Down on Counterfeit Drugs; Billions Are at Stake: FDA, Drug Makers 
Move to Reduce the Number of Fakes That Hit the Market, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Oct. 20, 2003, at A9. 
20
  Todd Datz, Faked in China, CSOONLINE.COM, Jan. 1, 2006, http://www.csoonline.com/ 
read/010106/faked_china.html.  See also GRAHAM SATCHWELL, A SICK BUSINESS: COUNTERFEIT 
MEDICINES AND ORGANISED CRIME 44 (2004),  available at http://www.stockholm-network.org/ 
downloads/publications/2b74e489-Sick%20Business.pdf.  In fact, it has been estimated that there is on 
average between 200,000 and 300,000 reported deaths in China each year due to counterfeit or substandard 
medicine.  See Peter Pitts, President, Ctr. for Med. in the Pub. Interest, Testimony: Counterfeit Drugs and 
China (May 31, 2006), http://www.cmpi.org/TestimonialsDetail.asp?contentdetailid=99&contenttypeid= 
8&page=1. 
21
  See Pitts, supra note 20. 
22
  See Lisa Lerer, Bitter Pills: Counterfeit Drugs Manufactured in China Are Landing in Some of the 
Poorest Areas in the World, Killing Those Most Desperate for Medical Attention, IP LAW & BUS., Dec. 1, 
2006, at 32. 
23
  Id.  
24
  Id.  For example, WHO and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control believe that substandard or 
ineffective medicines have contributed to the emergence of drug-resistant strains of cholera, salmonella, 
tuberculosis and other diseases.  See Hu & Gomez, supra note 9.  
25
  See Hu & Gomez, supra note 9, at 1-2.  
26
  See Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 1072. 
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drugs do not comply with safety regulations and do not pay taxes on their 
goods.27  This reduces government revenue because legitimate drug 
producers are less likely to enter the market and thus pay taxes if that market 
is highly saturated with counterfeits.28  Additionally, the counterfeit drug 
market stifles investment and innovation.29  The cost of investigating and 
prosecuting infringers is expensive for both companies and the 
government.30  In countries where counterfeiting is widespread, it can cost 
millions of dollars annually to track down infringers and pay the litigation 
costs associated with prosecuting them.31  Often, even if a company prevails 
in litigation, the financial results are far from cost-effective.32  These 
expenses will likely deter new companies from entering the pharmaceutical 
market and existing companies from investing in innovative efforts that 
could lead to life-saving discoveries.  This results in stifled pharmaceutical 
innovation, which harms both economies and public welfare globally. 
China’s efforts to avoid such harm and legitimize its IP market are 
evident in the struggles faced by Pfizer Pharmaceuticals (“Pfizer”) in China.  
Moreover, Pfizer’s effort to protect its IP rights (“IPR”) illustrates the 
difficulty of obtaining IP protection in China and China’s efforts made to 
become a respected member of the international IP community. 
B. The Pfizer Pharmaceuticals Case Reveals the Magnitude of the 
Counterfeiting Problem and China’s Effort to Develop IP Enforcement 
In recent years, several cases have demonstrated overall improvement 
in China’s IPR enforcement regime.  The Pfizer case, which involved several 
Chinese companies’ attempts to enforce what they claimed to be their IPR 
against Pfizer, illustrates such improvement and the resulting increased 
confidence in Chinese enforcement of IPR within the international 
community. 
The Chinese State Drug Administration approved the use of Pfizer’s 
drug Viagra in China on July 2, 2000.33  At the time, however, China’s State 
Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”) had not yet granted Pfizer a patent for 
                                           
27
  Id. 
28
  Jamie Miyazaki, Faking It Gucci Style, ASIA TIMES, Feb. 6 2004, available at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/FB06Dj01.html. 
29
  See Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 1072. 
30
  See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 15, at 3. 
31
  Id. 
32
  Id. 
33
  See Jeffrey A. Andrews, Pfizer’s Viagra Patent and the Promise of Patent Protection in China, 28 
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 10 (2006). 
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sildenafil citrate, the active ingredient in Viagra.34  In China, access to 
Viagra was available by prescription from senior physicians only, and 
distribution was confined to hospital pharmacies.35 
In May 2000, the promise for potential growth of China’s Viagra 
market immediately attracted the interest of counterfeit producers.  At this 
time a Chinese pharmaceutical company began illegally manufacturing 
sildenafil citrate.36  This company relied upon Pfizer’s SIPO disclosures to 
obtain information about Viagra’s active ingredient and to seek to obtain a 
patent for this ingredient itself.37  This led to a vast increase in the sale of 
Viagra in sex shops, airports, and pharmacies all over China.38  In fact, just 
six months after Pfizer introduced Viagra to the Chinese market, an 
estimated ninety percent of Viagra pills sold in Shanghai were counterfeit.39   
Such counterfeit distribution caused Pfizer to experience significant market 
pressure.40  Pfizer subsequently took steps to combat these counterfeit sales.  
However, it was not until September 19, 2001, when SIPO issued Pfizer a 
patent for the active ingredient in Viagra,41 that legal action commenced 
against the widespread counterfeiting.  At that time, a group of twelve 
Chinese drug companies petitioned the Patent Reexamination Board to 
invalidate Pfizer’s patent, leading to a series of IP infringement trials.42 
Such actions signaled an important change in Chinese IP enforcement.  
Until this time, the Chinese producers and sellers of pharmaceuticals dealt 
with similar situations by engaging in counterfeit activities instead of turning 
to legal proceedings.43  Specifically, if there was a conflict regarding IPR, 
instead of trying to enforce what they believed to be their patent or 
trademark, such parties often allowed the opposing party to obtain all legal 
rights and then engaged in infringement by producing and selling the given 
drug as a counterfeit.  Petitioning to the Patent Reexamination Board was a 
new approach to competing with foreign products.44  This change was 
                                           
34
  Id. 
35
  See Shi Pengyun, Viagra No Longer Hard to Get, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 7, 2002, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2002-02/07/content_105885.htm. 
36
  See Andrews, supra note 33, at 10. 
37
  Id. at 10-11. 
38
  Id. at 11. 
39
  Elaine Kurtenbach, China Court Upholds Pfizer’s Viagra Patent, CBSNEWS.COM, June 5, 2006, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/06/05/ap/business/mainD8I1U0UO0.shtml. 
40
  See Andrews, supra note 33, at 11. 
41
  Id. 
42
  Id. 
43
  See id. at 12. 
44
  See id.  
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further demonstrated by the decision of the Chinese patent review board,45 
which decided to uphold Pfizer’s patent rights for Viagra.46 
Similarly, in 2005, Pfizer also successfully fought to protect another 
drug, Lipitor, from Chinese counterfeiters.47  Three Chinese businesses and 
eleven Chinese individuals were indicted for their involvement in a forty-
two million dollar conspiracy to sell counterfeit Lipitor.48  As part of this 
effort, the Food and Drug Administration in the United States recalled over 
eighteen million Lipitor tablets.49  This enormous recall was due to the 
significant problem associated with deciphering counterfeit drugs from 
legitimate ones once they were released into the public market.50 
In response to these reoccurring cases, Pfizer, with the help of the 
Chinese government, made several efforts to address the counterfeiting 
problem in China.  For example, Pfizer opened a testing facility in Dalian, 
China51 and formed an alliance with the Shanghai Municipal Food and Drug 
Administration to detect and stop counterfeiting.52  Pfizer also signed two 
agreements with the Chinese state government.  These agreements laid out 
the parties’ joint efforts to fight against the production of counterfeit drugs 
through the use of investigation and drug testing.53  Through this initiative, 
Chinese officials recovered 600,000 counterfeit Viagra labels and packaging, 
440,000 counterfeit Viagra tablets, and 260 kilograms of raw materials used 
to manufacture counterfeit drugs.54  Also, in 2001, the Chinese government 
closed down 1300 companies for counterfeiting, while investigating 480,000 
cases of counterfeit drugs worth a combined total of fifty-seven million 
dollars.55  Furthermore, the Chinese State Food and Drug Administration 
announced that it had banned 114,000 unlicensed drug manufacturers and 
                                           
45
  In 2004, the Reexamination Board held that the technical openness of the patent specification was 
incompatible with Pfizer’s claim to rights and Pfizer lost at the administrative level; however this decision 
was overturned.  Id.  
46
  See Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 1093.   
47
  Problem of Counterfeit Drugs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 
and Human Resources of H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Randall W. Lutter, 
Acting Assoc. Comm’r for Policy and Planning, Food and Drug Administration). 
48
  Id. 
49
  See Hilboldt, supra note 13, at 888. 
50
  See Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 1070.  
51
  See Omario Kanji, Note, Paper Dragon: Inadequate Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in 
China, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1261, 1268 (2006).    
52
  Medical News Today, Pfizer Signs Agreement with Shanghai Government to Enhance Protection 
of Patients, May 19, 2004, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/8476.php. 
53
  See Hu & Gomez, supra note 9. 
54
  See Lutter, supra note 47.   
55
  See Pitts, supra note 20. 
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shut down 461 Chinese pharmaceutical factories between January and 
November of 2005 alone.56 
The Chinese state government’s efforts to more closely regulate IPR 
through increased investigation and litigation demonstrates its willingness to 
improve its national IP climate.57  To further effectuate this goal, as detailed 
below, China has joined several international IP organizations and signed 
various international treaties. 
C. China Complies with the Express Requirements of Various 
International IP Agreements 
In recent years, the Chinese national government has communicated a 
strong desire to encourage innovation through increased enforcement of 
IPR.58  During this time, China has joined international organizations and 
signed several treaties in order to solidify its position in the global IP 
market.59  However, China has continuously struggled to meet the 
requirements of these international instruments.60   
After joining WIPO in 1980,61 China continued its efforts towards 
becoming a participant in the international IP market by joining the Paris 
Convention on Industrial Property in March of 1985 and signing the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty in 1994.62  Additionally, in 1990, China agreed to 
register all trademarks with the International Bureau of WIPO through its 
accession to the Madrid Trademark Agreement.63  Finally, on December 1, 
2001, China officially became a member of the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”)64 and, at this time, became subject to requirements laid out in the 
                                           
56
  Id.  
57
  See Kristy Barnes, China Drug Safety Crackdown Continues, PACKWIRE, Nov. 6, 2007, 
http://www.packwire.com/news/ng.asp?n=77257-china-drug-safety-regulation. 
58
  See Jiang Zhipei, Recent Developments in China’s Judicial Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Address at Temple University Law School (Aug. 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/forum/forum43.htm.  See also U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra 
note 15, at 7. 
59
  See Andrew Evans, Note, Taming the Counterfeit Dragon: The WTO, TRIPS and Chinese 
Amendments to Intellectual Property Laws, 31 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 587, 587-88 (2003). 
60
  See Iyengar, supra note 4. 
61
  See Jessica Wong, The Challenges Multinational Corporations Face in Protecting Their Well-
Known Trademarks, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 937, 943 (2006).  WIPO is a specialized agency of the United 
Nations, dedicated to the development of an accessible and balanced international IP system.  See WIPO, 
What is WIPO?, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/what_is_wipo.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).   
62
  See Wong, supra note 61, at 943. 
63
  Id. 
64
  See generally World Trade Organization [WTO], Protocol on Accession of the People's Republic 
of China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001).  
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”).65 
China has amended its IP laws and regulations several times in order 
to comply with requirements of these international agreements; however, it 
continues to struggle to make the requisite changes to its administrative and 
judicial bodies.  Specifically, as discussed in further detail below, although 
the applicable laws have been altered to meet international requirements, 
China continues to lack full implementation of such laws.66  TRIPS requires 
WTO members to protect IPR by promulgating laws that are stringent 
enough to deter people from engaging in infringement.67  However, it is 
debatable whether China has promulgated appropriate law and policy to 
effectuate this required deterrent effect.68  In order to assess this issue, it is 
first helpful to consider the actual requirements laid out in the TRIPS 
agreement. 
Article 41(1) of TRIPS mandates that the legal consequences of IP 
infringement “constitute a deterrent to further infringements.”69  This is an 
important specification of the agreement because it places a significant 
burden on WTO members to take adequate legal action against IP 
infringement within its borders.  This article does not lay out specific 
penalties that would “constitute a deterrent,” and, therefore, it is not 
necessarily clear whether a specific country has met the standards required 
under TRIPS. 
Article 45 of TRIPS mandates that damages in cases of infringement 
sufficiently remedy the right holder’s injury and should be calculated based 
on the expense incurred by the patent holder and subsequent profits lost due 
to lacking sales of the genuine product.70  Additionally, Article 61 of TRIPS 
requires that members provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be 
applied “at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting . . . on a 
commercial scale.”71  Because WTO does not define “on a commercial 
                                           
65
  See Veronica Weinstein & Dennis Fernandez, WTO Pushes China Toward Greater IP Protection, 
LARTA INST. VOX, July 12, 2004, http://www.larta.org/lavox/articlelinks/2004/040712_wto.asp. 
66
  Trade with China: Hearing on U.S. Trade with China Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Geralyn Ritter, Vice President, International 
Affairs Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=5458. 
67
  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 61, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments--Results 
of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] (setting forth general provisions, 
enforcement of and standards concerning IP rights). 
68
  SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 17, at 19. 
69
  TRIPS, supra note 67, art. 41. 
70
  See id. art. 45. 
71
  Id. art. 61.  
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scale,” this language gives member states discretion in determining what 
amount meets this requirement. 
Despite possible ambiguities in these articles, TRIPS has played an 
important role in shaping Chinese IP law.  Currently, most observers 
consider Chinese standards to comply with TRIPS.72  However, despite such 
compliance, the production and sale of counterfeit drugs has not diminished 
in China due to weak enforcement and deterrence mechanisms in domestic 
law.73  An assessment of the Chinese IP laws used to protect rights holders 
from counterfeiting sheds light on this problem. 
III. COUNTERFEIT PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTION AND SALE VIOLATES 
CHINESE PATENT AND TRADEMARK LAWS  
Individuals or corporations engaged in the production or sale of 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals in China may be charged with the violation of 
multiple laws, including those related to IP infringement, pharmaceutical 
regulations, laws against unfair competition, and custom protections.74  
Parties harmed by the production or sale of counterfeit pharmaceuticals can 
also bring an infringement claim under trademark or patent law.75  If a 
person wishes to bring an action against a counterfeiter, these IP laws 
provide an avenue through which administrative, civil, or criminal action 
can be taken.76 
A. Businesses That Deal in Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals Are Infringing 
Chinese Patent Law  
If an individual or corporation produces a counterfeit 
pharmaceutical—one containing active ingredients or substances that are 
patented under Chinese law—the patent holder can bring a legal action 
against the manufacturer, seller, or importer of that counterfeit drug.77  Such 
action can be brought through an administrative authority or by an action in 
                                           
72
  See Counterfeiting in China: Roundtable on Intellectual Property Protection as Economic Policy: 
Will China Ever Enforce Its IP Laws? Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm. on China (May 16, 2005) (statement 
of Daniel Chow, Professor, Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of Law), available at 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/051605/index.php. 
73
  Id. 
74
  See Hilboldt, supra note 13, at 872. 
75
  Id. 
76
  See generally id. (describing different types of laws violated when counterfeiting takes place); 
U.S. Dep’t. of Comm. Int. Trade Admin., supra note 7. 
77
  See Hilboldt, supra note 13, at 873.  
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the people’s court.78  Patent infringement actions in China are brought to the 
intermediate people’s court and can be appealed to the Supreme People’s 
Court,79 whose decision is final.80  These cases are matters of both civil and 
criminal law and proceedings can be instituted following a complaint by the 
patentee, a prosecutor, or the court itself.81 
China’s first Patent Law, enacted in 1984, was amended in both 1992 
and 2000 to extend the scope of patent protection and to comply with 
international agreements and treaties.82  Unlike the United States’ patent 
system, which gives patent rights to the first inventor, China follows a first-
to-file system,83 established under Article 9 of the Patent Law.84  This means 
that patent rights are not necessarily granted to the first party to invent, but 
to the first party who files the invention; a different party often beats the 
inventor in this process.85  Additionally, a foreign patent application must be 
filed through an authorized Chinese patent agent unless the filing person or 
firm has a business office in China.86  This arguably makes patent filing 
more difficult for international competitors because they may have limited 
access to Chinese patent lawyers and information regarding current Chinese 
innovation. 
Counterfeiters can be found guilty of violating Article 60 of China’s 
Patent Law which states that a patentee can institute a legal proceeding 
against an infringee when that infringee “exploit[s a] patent without the 
authorization of the patentee.”87  Articles 57 through 62 address the legal 
proceedings and damages that follow such infringement.88  These articles are 
discussed in greater detail below. 
Because individual patents proscribe IP ownership of the active 
substances used to produce pharmaceuticals, the current Patent Law directly 
implicates the counterfeit market.  Assuming that IP laws are adequately 
                                           
78
  Ladas & Parry, LLP, Patent Litigation in China: Scope of Patent Protection, 
http://www.ladas.com/Litigation/ForeignPatentLitigation/ChinaPR_Patent_Litigation.html (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2007). 
79
  The Supreme People’s Court is the highest judicial organ in China.  For more information on the 
Supreme People’s Court, see ADB OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, Governmental 
Institutions, http://www1.oecd.org/daf/asiacom/countries/index_PRC.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2007). 
80
  Id. 
81
  Id. 
82
  See U.S. Dep’t. of Comm. Int. Trade Admin., supra note 7.  
83
  Id.   
84
  See Patent Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, 
amended Aug. 25, 2000), art. 9, translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 8, 2008) (P.R.C.) 
[hereinafter Patent Law]. 
85
  Id.  
86
  See U.S. Dep’t. of Comm. Int. Trade Admin., supra note 7.  
87
  Patent Law, supra note 84, art. 60. 
88
  See id. arts. 58-67. 
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enforced, counterfeiters cannot appropriate protected inventions from 
legitimate inventors without legal repercussions.  Specifically, the Patent 
Law provides infringees with a legal mechanism through which they can 
protect their IPR and recover damages when infringement occurs. 
B. Pharmaceutical Counterfeiters in China Violate Chinese Trademark 
Law 
Individuals or corporations may have a counterfeiting trademark claim 
if the product or trade dress—including the context of a label of the 
counterfeit product—is identical, or confusingly similar in appearance, to 
that of the authentic product.89  The first Chinese Trademark Law was 
adopted in 1982 and revised in both 1993 and 2001.90  The development of 
China’s Trademark Law has amounted to a continuous effort to comply with 
requirements laid out in TRIPS.91  Specifically, over time, the Trademark 
Law extended registration to include collective marks, certification marks, 
and three-dimensional symbols.92  Also, the highest adjudicative power in 
cases of infringement was transferred from an administrative to a judicial 
mechanism.93  
Article 52 of the Trademark Law lists five specific acts that are 
considered trademark infringements.94  Among other acts, these include 
selling goods that “bear a counterfeited registered trademark” and 
counterfeiting, making, or selling a registered trademark of another person 
without authorization or representation.95 
Like the Patent Law, China’s Trademark Law requires all foreign 
companies to register their trademarks through a Chinese trademark agent 
and in a Chinese language version.96  Also, as under its patent law, China has 
a first-to-file system for trademarks.97  This system does not require 
evidence of prior use or ownership and thus allows third parties to register 
                                           
89
  See Hilboldt, supra note 13, at 873. 
90
  See U.S. Dep’t. of Comm. Int. Trade Admin., supra note 7. 
91
  Trademark Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, 
amended Oct. 27, 2001), art. 43, translated in Intellectual Property Rights In China, 
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws11.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2008) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 
Trademark Law]. 
92
  See U.S. Dep’t. of Comm. Int. Trade Admin., supra note 7.  
93
  Trademark Law, supra note 91. 
94
  Id. art. 52. 
95
  Id.   
96
  Implementing Regulations of the Trademark Law (promulgated by St. Council, Aug. 3, 2002, 
effective Sept. 15, 2002), arts. 7-8, translated in http://sbj.saic.gov.cn/english/show.asp?id=53&bm=flfg 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
97
  Trademark Law, supra note 91, art 29.  
MARCH 2008 COUNTERFEIT PHARMACEUTICALS IN CHINA 451 
  
popular foreign marks.98  Local third parties, called trademark pirates, can 
thus gain rights over foreign popular marks and reap significant profits from 
the foreign trademark holders’ international popularity.99  This is especially 
beneficial to pharmaceutical counterfeiters, who can take advantage of 
parties holding popular marks that are unable to find IP protection in China. 
China has responded to this problem by promulgating laws to protect 
what are considered “well-known” marks.100  Under Article 2 of the 
Provisions on the Determination and Protection of Well-Known Marks, “a 
well-known mark refers to a mark that is widely known to the relevant 
sectors of the public and enjoys a relatively high reputation in China.”101  
Article 14 of China’s Trademark Law lays out five factors that the courts 
should consider when deciding whether something is or is not a well-known 
mark.102  Also, under Article 13 the legal owner of a mark that is not 
registered in China but is well-known there may bring a claim of opposition 
or cancellation against the previously registered mark.103 
As under patent law, trademark rights holders can utilize these 
provisions to protect themselves from infringement.  Counterfeiters violating 
trademark rights create illegitimate drugs and package them using a well-
known mark.104  This allows them to sell the cheaply-produced product at 
the legitimate drug’s market value, significantly reducing the trademark 
holder’s profits.  Trademark law provides a legal mechanism through which 
infringees can stop such infringement and recover damages for lost profits. 
IV. THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM DOES NOT EFFECTIVELY DETER 
PHARMACEUTICAL COUNTERFEITERS FROM ENTERING THE DRUG 
MARKET 
Despite the existence of legal mechanisms for stopping IP 
infringement, enforcement of Chinese IP law is insufficient for several 
reasons.  First, current Chinese IP law and methods of enforcement do not 
mandate strong enough punishments to deter counterfeiters from continuing 
                                           
98
  See U.S. Dep’t. of Comm. Int. Trade Admin., supra note 7.  
99
  See Wong, supra note 61, at 950.   
100
  See Alisa Cahan, China's Protection of Famous and Well-Known Marks: The Impact of China's 
Latest Trademark Law Reform on Infringement and Remedies, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 219, 222 
(2004).  There is currently no formal, universal definition for a “well-known” mark.  Id. at 219. 
101
  Provisions on the Determination and Protection of Well-Known Marks (issued by the St. Admin. 
for Indus. and Commerce, Apr. 17, 2003), art. 2, translated in http://english.ipr.gov.cn/ 
ipr/en/info/Article.jsp?a_no=2160&col_no=119&dir=200603 (last visited Mar. 1, 2008) (P.R.C.).  
102
  Trademark Law, supra note 91, art. 14.  
103
  Id. art. 13.  See also Wong, supra note 61, at 948. 
104
  See generally Wong, supra note 61, at 950 (discussing IP infringement claims relating to well-
known marks). 
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to infringe IPR.105  Second, local autonomy has led to corruption in both the 
local government and the judiciary, causing an overall lack of enforcement 
of existing IP law.  Third, inadequate judicial transparency and independence 
further hinders enforcement.  Fourth, there are insufficient resources 
allocated to fighting drug counterfeiting in both the judicial and 
administrative sectors. 
A. Current Administrative, Civil, and Criminal Enforcement of IPR Does 
Not Deter Parties from Engaging in Counterfeiting 
The Patent and Trademark Laws, by their express terms, provide 
protection from IP infringement and thus pharmaceutical counterfeiting.  In 
China, these laws are enforced either through an administrative mechanism 
or through adjudication, including both civil and criminal action.106  
However, it is arguable whether such laws effectively deter parties from 
engaging in pharmaceutical counterfeiting.  According to general deterrence 
theory, individuals will engage in criminal activities if they do not have a 
rational reason to fear punishment.107  Under this theory, parties who are 
aware of increased punishment will alter their decision-making process and 
may choose not to engage in a given crime.108  This theory, applied to drug 
counterfeiters in China, supports the argument that parties will continue to 
engage in counterfeiting as long as they are not adequately deterred from 
doing so. 
1. The Administrative Mechanism Is Most Often Used to Enforce IPR but 
Is Inadequate to Fight Drug Counterfeiting  
The administrative mechanism is the most utilized method of dealing 
with the drug counterfeiting problem in China today.109  Specifically, the 
trademark office under China’s State Administration on Agency and 
Commerce (“SAIC”) is responsible for the enforcement of trademark 
protection,110 whereas SIPO is responsible for enforcement of patent 
rights.111 
                                           
105
  See Iyengar, supra note 4.  
106
  See U.S. Dep’t. of Comm. Int. Trade Admin., supra note 7.  
107
  Robert Keel, Rational Choice and Deterrence Theory (July 14, 2005), http://www.umsl.edu/ 
~keelr/200/ratchoc.html. 
108
  Id. 
109
  U.S. Dep’t. of Comm. Int. Trade Admin., supra note 7.  
110
  See id. 
111
  Id. 
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SIPO is responsible for granting all patents and administratively 
enforcing them in provisional offices.112  This enforcement includes 
investigating, mediating, providing cease and desist orders, and imposing 
fines in infringement cases.113  Under Article 57 of the Patent Law, if 
infringement of a patent right occurs “the patentee or any interested party 
may either bring a lawsuit to the people’s court, or request the patent 
administrative department, for settlement.”114  The administrative authorities 
for patent affairs have the power to order the infringer to immediately cease 
any acts of infringement.115  Any party who is dissatisfied with such an order 
may, within 15 days of receiving notification, file a suit in the people’s court 
in accordance with Chinese Administrative Litigation Law.116  Under Article 
62, there is a two-year statute of limitations for filing a patent infringement 
suit, beginning on the day the patentee or the interested parties become 
aware, or should have become aware, of the act of infringement.117  If a suit 
is filed within the statute of limitations, and if the circumstances constitute a 
crime, the person deemed responsible shall be investigated for criminal 
liability under Article 216 of the Criminal Law.118 
Alternately, SAIC has authority over trademark registration, 
recognition of well-known marks, and enforcement of trademark 
protection.119  SAIC applies the Trademark Law to protect against IP 
infringement arising from drug counterfeiting.120  Article 53 of China’s 
Trademark Law states that “the interested parties shall resolve the dispute 
through consultation,” and if they cannot do so, “the trademark registrant or 
interested party may institute legal proceedings in the [p]eople’s [c]ourt.”121  
Both SIPO and SAIC have investigative power and the ability to render 
punishment when infringement is determined.122  Specifically, each can 
enjoin an infringer from continuing production, mandate the destruction of 
                                           
112
  Id. 
113
  U.S. Embassy Beijing, China, IPR Toolkit: Patent, http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/ 
iprpatent.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2008). 
114
  Patent Law, supra note 84, art. 57.   
115
  Id.   
116
  Id. 
117
  Id., art. 62. 
118
  Id., art. 58.  See Criminal Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 
14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), arts. 213-20, translated in http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/13/content_1384075.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2008) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Criminal Law] (addressing 
“Crimes of Infringing on Intellectual Property Rights”). 
119
  See U.S. Dep’t. of Comm. Int. Trade Admin., supra note 7. 
120
  Id. 
121
  Trademark Law, supra note 91, art. 53. 
122
  See U.S. Dep’t. of Comm. Int. Trade Admin., supra note 7. 
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infringing marks or products, impose fines, and remove machines used to 
produce counterfeit goods.123 
While these agencies may choose to pass cases along to the judicial 
sector for either civil or criminal action instead of dealing with them 
internally,124 such judicial action is not often utilized due mainly to the 
reluctance of administrative authorities to forward cases to the criminal 
authorities.125  Furthermore, infringees are also reluctant to bring an action 
directly to the judiciary for criminal investigation.126  This reluctance 
partially results from influential Chinese cultural ideals centered on 
collective societal welfare.127  Such emphasis on collective welfare results in 
a decrease in use of the adversarial system of litigation.128  Also, both the 
concept of litigation and IP law are relatively new to the Chinese legal 
system, thus many parties do not choose this route due to their lack of 
knowledge or experience of the system.129  For these reasons, most IP 
infringement cases remain in the administrative system.130 
Administrative agencies arguably do not effectively protect IPR 
holders.  Though legally empowered to enforce decisions, administrative 
agencies cannot award compensation to the IPR holders in most cases.131  
The harmed infringee, who may have suffered great financial harm due to 
the infringement, is therefore left without monetary redress.  And, while 
agencies do have the power to fine the infringer and seize goods and 
equipment used in manufacturing infringing products,132 these mechanisms 
are not very effective due to the shortage of available financial resources and 
trained staff to carry out enforcement.133  In China, local governments 
provide the financing necessary to run administrative agencies 
successfully.134  However, these governments may be reluctant to provide 
adequate funding for IP enforcement because it is financially beneficial for 
them to allow pharmaceutical counterfeiting to flourish in the local 
                                           
123
  Id.  
124
  Id. 
125
  See Ritter, supra note 66. 
126
  See U.S. Dep’t. of Comm., Int. Trade Admin., supra note 7.  
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  See Wong, supra note 61, at 963.  The Chinese are encouraged to understand their responsibilities 
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  Id. 
129
  See Iyengar, supra note 4. 
130
  See Wong, supra note 61, at 964. 
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  See U.S. Dep’t. of Comm., Int. Trade Admin., supra note 7.  
132
  Id. 
133
  See Wong, supra note 61, at 965.  This resource deficit is partially attributable to the constant 
increase in the volume of patent and trademark applications, which consumes a large part of the agencies’ 
time and resources.  Id. 
134
  See id. at 967. 
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economies.135  Due to the lack of available resources and adequate 
enforcement, administrative bodies are not likely to effectively fight against 
IP infringement or to deter parties from entering into the counterfeit drug 
market. 
2. Civil Action Does Not Effectively Deter Drug Counterfeiters from 
Entering the Market 
Like the threat of administrative action, penalties incurred as a result 
of civil litigation are arguably not effective at deterring counterfeiters.  In 
China, there has been a steady increase in private civil proceedings focused 
on IP infringement.  For example, the number of civil IP cases initiated in 
Chinese courts grew from 5265 in 2001 to 7800 in 2002.136  Still, despite the 
increased involvement of the judiciary in cases of IP infringement, there has 
been little impact on the production of counterfeit drugs in China.  This is 
due largely to the fact that even when cases are tried, the resulting 
punishment is too insignificant to cause real deterrent effects.137  Article 58 
of the Patent Law restricts fines to no more than three times the infringer’s 
income, and Article 60 indicates that either the losses suffered by the 
patentee or the infringer’s profits should be used to calculate damages.138  
Further, under Article 56 of China’s Trademark Law, the amount of damages 
for infringement is the profit the infringer has earned or the injury the 
infringee has suffered from that infringement, including the expenses spent 
by the infringee to stop the infringement.139  Where this amount is difficult 
to determine, the people’s court imposes an amount of damages not 
exceeding RMB 500,000 (approximately U.S. $62,500).140 
These limitations likely protect infringers who could otherwise be 
saddled with very large damage payments depending on the method of 
calculation employed by the court.  Furthermore, because the amount set 
under Article 56 is merely a maximum, the actual fine imposed is often 
much lower.  For example, the average fine imposed on counterfeiters in 
                                           
135
  Id.  
136
  See Jiang Zhipei, Recent Developments in China’s Judicial Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Address at Temple University Law School (Aug. 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/forum/forum43.htm. 
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  SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 17, at 19. 
138
  Patent Law, supra note 84, arts. 58, 60. 
139
  Trademark Law, supra note 91, art. 56. 
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2000 was $794, and the average compensation to infringees was $19.141  
This amount is not even increased for mass production infringers who have 
the ability to earn colossal profits and cause massive harm to scores of 
people.142  In fact, because counterfeiters have the potential to gain 
enormous profits, such low penalties are often considered a mere fiscal 
speed bump in doing business and thus do not cause potential counterfeiters 
to change course.143 
In addition to the fact that such provisions regarding damages may 
leave the law ineffective in deterring future infringement, it is debatable 
whether the fines currently imposed under Chinese law satisfy the TRIPS 
deterrence requirement.  Again, TRIPS does not provide specific guidelines 
for fines imposed on counterfeiters and therefore does not provide any 
binding international norms that member nations must follow when 
sanctioning counterfeiters.  Article 45 of TRIPS requires that damages 
provide “adequate” compensation to the rights holder.144  However, it does 
not clarify what remedy would meet this requirement.  Under a typical case 
of IP infringement, the potential harm caused to a rights holder could include 
the loss of his or her entire business and all assets tied to such business.  This 
type of damage is not likely to be remedied by providing compensation 
equal to the production costs and price of the genuine product.  It could be 
argued that it is therefore not “adequate,” and thus that existing remedies 
under Chinese law are not in compliance with the requirements of TRIPS. 
The problem of insufficient redress in cases of IP infringement is 
further complicated by the fact that civil cases are not adjudicated equally 
for all IP players.  According to China’s Civil Procedure Act, civil cases are 
usually handled within six months from the filing date.145  Yet foreign parties 
are not protected by this law and therefore their cases may take years to 
adjudicate.146  During this time, thousands of counterfeit drugs could 
continue to circulate in the Chinese drug market, resulting in inadequate 
legal relief for an aggrieved foreign party.147 
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  See Chow, supra note 72 (describing the fines and compensation in all counterfeiting cases in 
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  See Iyengar, supra note 4. 
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3. Chinese Criminal Law Is Inadequate to Deter Pharmaceutical 
Counterfeiters 
Like its administrative and civil counterparts, Chinese criminal law is 
inadequate to deter IP infringement.  Under TRIPS, all member countries are 
required to provide for criminal procedures and penalties in cases of 
pharmaceutical counterfeiting.148  Even though China has formally complied 
with this provision, simply providing for the possibility of criminal 
prosecution does not ensure adequate enforcement.  In 2000, only about one 
in five-hundred cases were referred from the administrative to the judicial 
authorities for criminal prosecution, and this number has not significantly 
increased over time.149 
Chinese criminal law is arguably insufficient to deter individuals from 
engaging in pharmaceutical counterfeiting.  Article 213 of the Criminal Law 
deals with counterfeiting trademarks.150  This provision is only utilized 
when, according to Article 59 of the Trademark Law, “the case is so serious 
as to constitute a crime.”151  Under Article 59, when a case is “serious 
enough,” criminal prosecution shall follow, in addition to compensation for 
the damages suffered by the infringee.152  The literal reading of this language 
implies that IP infringement and criminality can be mutually exclusive under 
the law.153  The circular assertion that something which constitutes a serious 
crime is a crime arguably creates space for vast judicial discretion to decide 
whether or not a counterfeiter should face criminal liability.154  This 
distinction can cause failures in the enforcement against counterfeiting 
because courts may refrain from imposing criminal sanctions due to the 
pressure they receive from local governments.155 
If the case is considered serious enough to constitute a crime, Article 
213 and 216 of the Criminal Law may be applied.156  The maximum allotted 
prison sentence under the Criminal Law is not more than three years when 
the “circumstances are serious.”157  Under this law, it is up to the judge to 
decide what constitutes a “serious circumstance,” and because there is no 
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  See Chow, supra note 72. 
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  See Criminal Law, supra note 118, art. 213.  
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  SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 17, at 19.  
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minimum length of imprisonment mandated, the judge could arguably 
choose to give a minimal prison sentence or no prison sentence at all for 
counterfeit convictions.158  The same maximum prison sentence is allotted 
under Article 214 for someone who knowingly sells merchandise under a 
counterfeit trademark and under Article 215 for someone who is forging, 
manufacturing, or selling without authority another’s registered 
trademarks.159  Similarly, under Article 216, a maximum of three years 
imprisonment is provided for an individual who “counterfeits other people’s 
patents.”160  Again, there is judicial discretion as to which offense should 
incur this maximum sentence and how long the prison terms should run. 
Armed with this discretion, judges may choose to impose very low 
sentences for patent-related counterfeiting.  Further, even if a judge did wish 
to impose a higher sanction, he or she would be bound by the low cap of 
three years.161  In a very limited exception under Article 214, this time of 
imprisonment can be extended up to seven years for cases where there is a 
significantly large amount of sales.162  However, this exception is rarely 
utilized because judges tend to avoid holding that a huge sales volume has 
been produced or sold in reaction to pressure from local governments that 
want to protect their interests in the counterfeit drug market.163  The resulting 
prison terms prescribed for counterfeiting crimes are frequently too low to 
deter parties from engaging in counterfeit drug production and sale.164 
Furthermore, even when judges do attempt to hand down harsher 
penalties for violations of IP law, they struggle to find and apply the 
appropriate law governing infringement.165  Because local people’s 
congresses have the power to promulgate new laws and regulations to 
address IPR, and there is no formal communication system between the 
various Chinese localities, the applicable law is often inconsistent and 
ambiguous.166  This inconsistency arguably encourages counterfeiters to 
relocate to areas governed by less stringent laws, as they may receive better 
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treatment from courts sitting in certain localities, which in turn likely drowns 
those courts in IP litigation.  This problem has partially been alleviated with 
China’s obligations under TRIPS, however significant variance in legal 
interpretation remains, making protection of IPR inconsistent.167 
B. Local Autonomy Has Led to Corruption and Strong Local Support for 
the Counterfeit Pharmaceutical Market 
Due to the inconsistency and lack of enforcement of IP law, 
strengthening the current law alone would likely not be sufficient to deter 
the production of counterfeit drugs.  Regardless of the remedies tied to the 
infringement of IPR, the final decision of which mark to protect or which 
patent right to uphold is left in the hands of subjective local courts and 
administrative agencies.168  Therefore, in order to assess the effectiveness of 
amending current IP law it is important to consider the forces that influence 
the judiciary’s decisions in cases of drug counterfeiting. 
Insufficient enforcement of the law, caused by local protectionism of 
drug counterfeiting, has arguably decreased even the low deterrent effect 
that current legal mechanisms provide.  Based on its actions and statements, 
the central government in China has indicated a dedication to the protection 
of IPR.169  However, this central level authority is comprised mainly of 
legislative and policy-making bodies, while actual implementation and 
enforcement of law occurs at the local level.170  In recent years, there has 
been an increased trend towards solidifying local autonomy in China.171  
This exertion has resulted in localism—the emergence of administrative 
bureaucracy in regions across China.172  As a result, Beijing’s central power 
has eroded due to the formation of regional concentrations of power.173  
Although these localities must report to the central Chinese government, 
they have developed significant independence and autonomy over their own 
geographic areas, developing their own mini-economies, laws, and 
government power. 
The growth of localism seriously affected the stability of the 
counterfeit pharmaceutical market in China.  Specifically, local autonomy 
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has led to the corruption of local officials, who may accept kickbacks and 
bribes in exchange for either ignoring the counterfeiting activity in their 
localities or becoming active participants in the counterfeit business 
themselves.174  Many of these local officials significantly benefit from the 
financial benefits associated with counterfeiting and therefore have a strong 
incentive to support continued production.175 
Furthermore, local governments and communities also benefit 
indirectly from the counterfeit drug market.  In many localities, 
counterfeiters significantly contribute to the local market through the use of 
transportation, restaurants, and hotels.176  In some regions, the counterfeit 
market is so intertwined with the legitimate local market that it has become 
nearly impossible to distinguish the counterfeit from the legitimate 
businesses.177  In such areas, shutting down counterfeit production might 
seriously impact the local economy due to reliance on the counterfeiters’ 
financial investment in the area.178  Over time, such localism has given both 
government and local businesses strong incentive to support the counterfeit 
drug market.  This structure of support makes IPR enforcement difficult 
because the judiciary lacks adequate independence from local officials and 
therefore tends not to render decisions that significantly harm the local 
counterfeit market.179  
C. The Lack of Judicial Transparency and Independence in China 
Exacerbates the Counterfeiting Problem 
In addition to the growth of localism in China, the lack of judicial 
independence in China significantly hampers IPR enforcement.180  The 
Chinese Constitution grants the people’s court power of independent 
adjudication;181 however, in practice, the courts are reliant on the Chinese 
government in many aspects.182  There is a growing relationship between the 
local courts and other components of the local political system which not 
only hinders judicial independence but has given rise to local 
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protectionism.183  In fact, many leaders of Chinese local governments view 
courts simply as “subordinate departments of the local government.”184 
Under such local protectionism, judges tend to bias their decisions in 
favor of parties supported by local committees or local people’s 
congresses.185  Chinese judges are especially affected by this pressure 
because they do not have tenure and, therefore, are subject to loss of benefits 
or even removal if they render a verdict that is disfavored by the local 
government.186  Additionally, local courts may suffer from significant 
funding reductions if they do not take government interests seriously.187  
This lack of independence has a significant impact on the prosecution of 
pharmaceutical counterfeiters. 
This issue is magnified by the lack of transparency within the 
judiciary itself, and the great potential for judicial corruption.  The status and 
salaries of judges are low.188  Meanwhile, the large amounts of money and 
property at stake in disputes involving counterfeiting create an added risk of 
corruption.189  This, coupled with the shortage of adequately trained judges 
and lawyers,190 allows for the possibility of serious unethical or 
unprofessional conduct.191  Thus, judges may be more likely to take a bribe 
from a counterfeiter in exchange for a more favorable ruling in an infringer’s 
favor, adding to the levels of corruption revolving around the counterfeit 
market. 
D. A Significant Shortage of Resources Available to Address IP 
Infringement in China Encourages Growth in Counterfeiting 
Both the administrative and judicial spheres in China lack the 
resources necessary to impact pharmaceutical counterfeiting.192  The Chinese 
government is responsible for providing funding and other resources to fight 
against the production and sale of counterfeit drugs and has publicly 
announced its intention to increase such efforts.193  However, there are 
insufficient funds, personnel, and government resources allocated to attack 
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the counterfeiting problem, and the current levels of resources are only 
likely to decline. 
Again, the administrative mechanism of either SIPO or SAIC handles 
most cases of IP infringement in China.194  However, these agencies are also 
responsible for determining whether IPR should be granted in the first 
place.195  Due to the influx of parties seeking to obtain IPR, these 
organizations allocate a significant portion of their budgets and personnel to 
reading and reviewing patent and trademark applications and thus have 
limited resources remaining to handle the investigation and adjudication of 
infringement claims. 
Absent increased funding for enforcement purposes, China’s growing 
involvement in the IP market is likely to lead to further depletions in 
government resources.  For example, SIPO is already experiencing a 
resource crunch due to a large increase in patent filings.  A report produced 
by WIPO shows a 488% increase in patent applications in China since 
1995.196  More troubling are figures released in 2006 that reveal that more 
than 90% of Chinese companies have no experience with IPR and have 
never submitted a patent to SIPO.197  As the trend towards protection of 
innovation grows in China, many of these companies may apply for IP 
protection to keep up with their competitors, causing SIPO to become 
overloaded and unable to handle patent infringement cases.198  SAIC is 
likely to experience similar issues with the increase of trademark filings and 
the simultaneous growth of IP infringement claims.199 
Similar budget constraints exist in the judiciary.  The courts are often 
unable to deal with counterfeiting actions effectively due to the lack of 
resources allocated for such adjudication.  This resource crunch is further 
frustrated by judicial inefficiency caused by lack of training.  IP law is 
relatively new in China and neither judges, prosecutors, nor defense counsel 
are properly trained to adjudicate cases of IP infringement.200  This arguably 
decreases the speed of adjudication and thus increases overall cost.  
Furthermore, as in the administrative sector, if IP infringement litigation 
becomes more frequent and the government does not increase the courts’ 
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budgets, the judiciary will likely not be able to carry such a large load of 
cases, possibly causing infringees to suffer from additional losses during 
lengthy litigation. 
V. CHINA SHOULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO FIGHT COUNTERFEITING 
BY CLARIFYING EXISTING LAW AND FIGHTING CORRUPTION AT ITS 
SOURCE 
As described above, many IP infringement cases currently remain to 
be tried in the administrative sector.  Even when transferred to the judiciary, 
infringement is treated as a crime only if the presiding judge deems the case 
to be “serious” enough to warrant such penalties.201  This discretion often 
leads to lenient enforcement because judges tend to avoid rendering harsh 
decisions due to internal corruption or as a reaction to pressure from local 
government officials seeking to protect their own stake in the counterfeit 
market.202  Two main steps could be taken to improve the current 
counterfeiting situation in China.  First, fines should be increased, and 
enforcement mechanisms should be strengthened to ensure future deterrence 
of IP infringement.203  Second, an agency should be created to monitor the 
judiciary and local government officials, investigate counterfeiting activities, 
and educate the public regarding the negative implications of counterfeiting. 
A. Chinese Laws Should Be Amended to Increase Fines and Prison 
Terms Imposed on Pharmaceutical Counterfeiters  
China’s ineffective battle against counterfeiting stems partially from 
the insufficient punishment described above.  Specifically, the low 
maximum fines and imprisonment terms prescribed by civil and criminal 
laws are slight punishments when compared to the enormous profits a party 
can acquire through counterfeiting.204  These laws should therefore be 
amended to increase administrative and criminal sanctions to levels high 
enough to ensure that the risk of counterfeiting outweighs possible profits 
earned by the production or sale of counterfeit pharmaceuticals.  As a matter 
of general deterrence, counterfeiters will rationally weigh this increased 
severity of punishment when deciding whether to enter the counterfeit 
market, and with more stringent punishment, many will be deterred from 
doing so. 
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First, a specific provision should be added to both the Patent Law and 
the Trademark Law stating that producing or selling counterfeit drugs is a 
crime and will be tried as such.205  Classifying counterfeiting drugs as a 
crime would diminish judicial discretion in the determination of whether 
specific cases should be deemed criminal, because all counterfeiting cases 
would automatically be considered “serious” enough to constitute a crime. 
Second, in order for a criminal classification of counterfeiting to result 
in significant deterrence, the fines and prison terms mandated for such 
crimes should be increased.206  If counterfeiters face increased fines and 
prolonged prison terms, they are less likely to enter the counterfeiting 
market and more likely to cease current production to avoid such 
punishment.  Classifying acts of drug counterfeiting as a crime would 
arguably lead to increased judicial involvement in the enforcement of IPR, 
as all such criminal proceedings would be automatically transferred to the 
judicial branch. 
In order to deal with this growing problem, the Chinese central 
government must make additional funds available to combat counterfeiting.  
Funding must not only be provided for adjudicatory proceedings, but also 
for the police, who must be properly trained in methods used to trace and 
effectively confiscate and destroy counterfeit drugs.207  In order to provide 
such funding, the Chinese government should create a fund comprised of the 
confiscated profits from convicted counterfeiters.  A large portion of these 
profits would go to the infringee in the form of damages and/or to support 
victims’ healthcare costs, and a certain portion could be allocated amongst 
the various entities working to fight against pharmaceutical counterfeiting in 
order to fund their efforts. 
B. A Designated Anti-Corruption Agency Could Decrease Corruption 
and Increase Enforcement 
In order to protect IPR and decrease counterfeiting, China should 
address the problem of protectionism from its source at the local level.  
Although amending Chinese law and providing resources for judicial action 
are two important steps towards adequate IPR protection, levels of Chinese 
pharmaceutical counterfeiting will probably not diminish as long as local 
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government officials bar effective adjudication and enforcement.208  
Specifically, China should create an agency solely designed to fight the 
corruption associated with counterfeit pharmaceutical production and sale.  
Currently, an anti-corruption agency—the Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (“ICAC”)—operates in Hong Kong.  The ICAC is 
charged with fighting general corruption in Hong Kong.209  This agency 
could be used as a model for an anti-corruption agency targeting the 
pharmaceutical industry.  The ICAC uses a three-prong approach consisting 
of deterrence, prevention, and education that has proven to be relatively 
successful at fighting some types of corruption in Hong Kong.210  The ICAC 
can, after obtaining a court order, scrutinize bank accounts and execute 
search warrants, as well as run major prevention and education 
campaigns.211  
Although the ICAC reveals China’s strong anti-corruption sentiment, 
it alone is inadequate to fight against corruption relating to pharmaceutical 
counterfeiting.  Agents working at the ICAC do not have the requisite 
expertise on counterfeiting and IP laws to address the complex issues 
associated with the counterfeit market.  Additionally, the ICAC’s powers do 
not reach beyond its local boundaries because it is located exclusively in 
Hong Kong, whereas pharmaceutical counterfeiting spreads across localities 
and borders.  Furthermore, because corruption associated with drug 
counterfeiting is vast, the ICAC likely does not have adequate resources to 
attack the problem effectively.  For these reasons, an anti-corruption agency 
targeted specifically at fighting corruption related to drug counterfeiting 
should be established in China. 
Unlike the ICAC, a new anti-corruption agency should be established 
with multiple offices in different regions in order to address corruption at the 
local level effectively.  Because counterfeiting-related corruption is unique 
in each locality, each local anti-corruption department should be made up of 
highly trained and experienced agents capable of tackling counterfeiting in 
that specific region.  Each office should be required to report to a central 
location monitored by the national Chinese government to ensure that 
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employees at each locality do not become involved in local corruption 
themselves.  The central office should then be required to report to the WTO, 
which would monitor compliance with TRIPS requirements.  This would, in 
turn, likely lead to increased international confidence in Chinese IPR 
enforcement. 
Similar to the ICAC’s power to obtain warrants, this anti-corruption 
agency should be vested with investigative and auditing powers212 in order 
to ensure that local government officials, judges, and lawyers do not take 
bribes from counterfeit producers and sellers.  Further, like the ICAC, this 
agency should educate the public on drug counterfeiting and should establish 
a public complaint system through which citizens can report incidents of 
counterfeiting.213  Such efforts have proven to be successful in the ICAC’s 
fight against corruption214 and would arguably have a similar effect on the 
counterfeit-pharmaceutical industry. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although China has taken several important steps to gain the 
confidence of the international community, its current enforcement of IPR 
remains inadequate to deter individuals from entering the counterfeit 
pharmaceutical market.  In order to improve enforcement, the Chinese 
government should amend its laws to include higher financial sanctions and 
longer prison terms to deter counterfeiters.  It should also funnel more 
resources into the judicial sector so it can better deal with infringement 
actions.  Simultaneously, China should attack corruption at the local level by 
setting up an agency targeted at corruption associated with pharmaceutical 
counterfeiting.  Targeting local corruption and amending applicable law will 
allow for increased enforcement and, with time, will likely deter 
counterfeiters from entering the market. 
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